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ISSUES PRESENTED FOR REVIEW 
1. What is the duty of a landlord to a 
commercial tenant under a monthly rental arrangement? 
2. Is a landlord obligated to protect tenants 
from the criminal attacks of third parties? 
3. Did the appellant-landlord breach his duty 
toward respondent? 
4. Did the trial court commit prejudicial error 
in failing to give the appellant's requested instructions 
regarding the duty of a landlord towards his commercial 
tenant? 
5. Did the plaintiffs lay adequate foundation 
for the admission of their exhibits relating to losses of 
inventory? 
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STATEMENT OF THE CASE 
Nature, This is an appeal from a jury verdict 
for damages allegedly suffered by the respondents when 
unknown criminals burglarized their store* At the time 
of the loss, respondents were renting on a monthly basis 
the premises from appellant. 
Course and disposition in court below. On 
September 12, 1984, respondents filed their complaint in 
the court below based on the negligence of appellant in 
renting to a particular tenant or in making holes in the 
floor of an apartment above the jewelry store for repair 
work. (R. 8-11) . The case was assigned to the Honorable 
James S. Sawaya. 
The matter was tried before a jury from May 
21-24, 1985. At the close of the respondents1 case, 
appellant moved for a directed verdict. (R. 553-555). 
The Court denied the Motion for Directed Verdict. (R. 
561-562). 
The jury returned a verdict in favor of the 
respondents. Judgment was entered on the verdict. (R. 
216-218) . 
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STATEMENT OF FACTS 
Respondents brought this action in the court 
below when unknown criminals burglarized their jewelry 
business. The thrust of their complaint was that the 
appellant was negligent in renting to a particular tenant 
of reputed bad character and in cutting holes in a floor 
in an apartment above their business. (R. 2-7, 44-46). 
Entry into the store was made through Apartment 
214, which was directly above the store. (R. 278). This 
was one of the four apartments which were directly above 
the respondents1 store. (R. 353, 612). Appellant had 
cut several holes in the wood floor of Apartment 214 to 
locate water leaks and repair the pipes. (R. 224, 643). 
Appellant was remodelling the upstairs floor and was 
changing the entire layout of that particular apartment. 
(R. 382, 645). During that remodelling, the door to 
Apartment 214 was usually kept locked. (R. 339). 
There were three layers of flooring between the 
apartment and the respondents1 sales area. There was the 
wood floor of the apartment, approximately 14 inches 
below that layer was a three-quarter inch layer of lath 
-3-
and plaster, consisting of one-half inch plaster and 
one-quarter inch wood, and below that was the false 
ceiling to the respondents1 store. (R. 225-27, 648-49). 
Appellant worked on the piping in the space between the 
apartment's floor and the lath and plaster, having never 
penetrated the lath and plaster into the respondents' 
store. (R. 227, 647-50, 658). He did not penetrate into 
the lath and plaster because all of the repairs were 
effected above it and he assumed the respondents had the 
ceiling tied into their burglar alarm. (R. 648-49). 
The evening before the burglary, appellant had 
been unable to enter Apartment 214. He discovered 
someone had entered the room without permission. (R. 
231-34) . He entered the room and examined it. No one 
was present and nothing was disturbed. (R. 231-34) . He 
then locked the windows and the door. (R. 234-37, 
350-54). He had assumed a transient had sought shelter 
from the winter storm, but he did not see any 
unauthorized persons in the area. (R. 237, 354). Later 
that evening, the apartment manager unlocked the room and 
made an examination. He found all was secure, including 
the windows and door. (R. 370, 377-79, 388). He also 
saw no strangers in the area. (R. 337). 
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The next morning, the manager went to the room 
to continue the reconstruction and discovered someone had 
burglarized the apartment by breaking a locked window and 
entering. (R. 371). He also found the burglars had 
penetrated the lath and plaster layer and entered the 
jewelry store with a rope ladder. (R. 371). He called 
the police department. (R. 372). 
The Murray Police Department responded to the 
scene. The investigation revealed the burglars were a 
sophisticated group. (R. 219). Detective Christensen of 
the Murray Police Department had never seen this 
sophisticated of a group of thievesf even though he had 
investigated hundreds of burglaries. (R. 213). The 
thieves "shaved" the alarm boxesf both the inside and 
outside. (R. 312) . They were able to deactivate the 
burglary system. Apparently, a circular saw was used. 
(R. 312) . He checked with the burglar alarm company 
which had installed the security system, and its 
personnel could not assist him with the method of 
"shaving." (R.313). Neither the police department or 
the alarm company possessed this type of instrument. (R. 
313, 580). The police could not locate fingerprints and 
assumed gloves had been used by the group of thieves. 
(R. 296, 307-09). The thieves carried off a safe, 
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which would have taken two to three personsf according to 
the police officer (R. 309-10) , and possibly an excess of 
four persons, according to respondent Virgil Steadman (R. 
453). The burglars came well prepared in that they 
brought with them railroad ties to help load the safe 
onto a vehicle. (R. 308) • These ties were left at the 
scene and were examined by the apartment manager as well 
as the police. The apartment manager testified that the 
railroad ties had not been used in the reconstruction 
process and these particular ties were not present before 
the discovery of the burglary. The ties had been cut 
into a wedge shape in order to facilitate rolling a safe 
up them. (R. 382-85; Ex. 5). 
The thieves were also of sufficient 
sophistication that they avoided the internal sensors of 
the store. They avoided the trip devices located in the 
display cases which contained merchandise (R. 302, 448, 
479, 480)f and under the floor pads, (R. 303, 450, 479). 
In fact, the group was sophisticated enough to avoid that 
part of the ceiling which had been "bugged" by the 
respondents. (R. 451-53). They had armed about a 10 by 
20 foot area of their 20 by 60 foot ceiling because of a 
previous burglary attempt which had occurred before 
- f i -
appellant had bought the building. (R. 492-93, 495-96). 
The thieves also avoided the armed floor pad and display 
cases directly underneath their ladder. (R. 484-85). 
Infact, they stepped onto that case in descending into the 
store. 
The crime has never been solved. (R. 218f 443). 
SUMMARY OF ARGUMENTS 
1. A landlord owes no duty to a commercial 
tenant under a monthly tenancy. The tenant accepts the 
premises "as is." It is the tenant's obligation to 
examine the premises for their adequacy and any potential 
problems they may present. In fact, no testimony 
regarding the duty of the landlord was ever adduced at 
trial through any of the witnesses. No standard was 
articulated to the jury in terms of any instructions. 
2. A landlord is not the insurer of the safety 
of his tenant and cannot be obligated to protect that 
tenant from the criminal attacks of unknown third 
parties. Under the facts of this casef appellant 
landlord has been made the guarantor of the respondent 
tenants' safety, without any evidence showing he acted 
unreasonably. 
3. The proximate cause of the respondents' 
damages was the burglary committed by unknown third 
parties. The court erred when it failed to give the 
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instructions requested by appellant regarding the duty of 
care of a landlord and the instructions relating to 
intervening cause. Moreover, there was no evidence the 
burglars and their success were connected to the 
respondent. Since the court never defined the duty of 
the respondent the jury was left with no standard by 
which to judge the acts or failure to act of the 
respondent and compare that to the criminal attacks of 
the intervening third parties. 
4. The respondents1 entire evidence of damages 
consisted of a list prepared after the burglary and for 
which no adequate foundation was laid for its submission. 
There was no evidence qualifying any of their witnesses 
to give value of the items on that list. This is not the 
typical case of an owner testifying to value of a 
possession. Even if such were the circumstance, there 
must be foundation for that opinion. In this case, 
precious gems, metals, and jewelry were the items lost. 
These materials1 values are not within the knowledge of 
the average person. Their values must be established by 
competent expert testimony. The list further did not 
qualify as a summary document since no adequate 
foundation was laid for its admission. The entire 
evidence of damages lacked foundation under the 
exceptions to the hearsay rule and through competency of 
the witnesses through which it was introduced. 
ARGUMENT 
POINT I 
A COMMERCIAL TENANT UNDER A MONTHLY 
TENANCY ACCEPTS THE PREMISES "AS 
IS", AND THE LANDLORD OWES NO DUTY 
OF PROTECTION TO THE TENANT. 
The plaintiffs, conducting a jewelry business, 
were renting from appellant Brown on a monthly tenancy; 
they did not want a lease. (R.425). There was no 
warranty regarding the premises ever extended by the 
appellant Brown. In Jesperson v. Deseret News, 119 Ut. 
235, 240-41, 225 P.2d 1050, 1053 (1951), this court set 
forth the landlordfs duty to a tenant regarding leased 
premises. This court held: 
...The condition of the premises 
was equally apparent to both lessor 
and lessee. No warranty was 
included in the lease that the 
premises would sustain the weights 
proposed to be placed on it by the 
lessee. Under such circumstances, 
the tenant took the risk of the 
premises as they were. See Powell 
v. Johnny Hughes Orphanage, supra, 
(148 Virginia 331, 138 S.E. 367), 
wherein the court quotes from 16 
R.C.L. Section 270 as follows: 
fIn the absence of warranty, deceit 
or fraud on the part of the 
landlord, the rule of caveat emptor 
applies to the lease of the real 
estate, the control of which passes 
to the tenant to make examination 
of the demised premises to 
determine their safety and 
adaptability to the purpose for 
which they are hired.1 
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This is the general rule and has been recognized by other 
jurisdictions in cases of similar facts. In Robiceaux v. 
Roy, 352 So.2d 766 (Louisianaf 1977) , the Louisiana court 
addressed the very issue before this court. The 
plaintiff in that case had leased space from the landlord 
to conduct a jewelry business. The landlord rented 
adjoining premises to another individual. Shortly 
afterwardsf unknown persons broke through a common wall 
between the two premises. The jewelry store was 
burglarized. The Louisiana court held that the landlord 
was not liable for the burglary because the landlord had 
no duty to protect the tenant against disturbances by 
third persons with no right to enter. See alsoy Peter 
Piper Tailoring Company v. Dobbin, 192 S.W. 1044 (Mo. 
1917) for a recitation of the same rule. 
The plaintiffs knew reconstruction was taking 
place, because they had been upstairs and could actually 
hear the work in progress. (R.463). Mr. Brown had also 
told Mr. Virgil Steadman the general terms about the 
reconstruction process. (R.346) . No intrusions from the 
repair work occurred to the plaintiffs1 rented premises. 
(Id.). During the repairs, Mr. Brown did penetrate the 
floor to an apartment above the plaintiffs1 store. 
(R.647-50). The intrusion did not go through the lath 
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and plaster which separated the premises leased by the 
plaintiffs from the apartment floor nor through the false 
ceiling of the plaintiffs1 store. The false ceiling was 
directly below the lath and plaster layer. On the day of 
the burglary, the plaintiffs were renting exactly what 
they had been renting during their entire tenancy—a 
jewelry store from the floor to the false ceiling and up 
to the lath and plaster. No warranty had been extended 
regarding their security. They could have ascertained 
the adequacy of the premises better than appellant Brown. 
In factf Mr. Brown assumed the plaintiffs had extended 
their burglar alarm system through the entire ceiling. 
(Id.) . Mr. Virgil Steadman knew of a previous burglary 
attempt which had occurred through the ceiling years 
before Mr. Brown bought the building. It was he who had 
informed Mr. Brown of this attempt. (R.453-54, 455-56, 
651). The only protective steps taken were to "bug" only 
a portion of the ceiling instead of the entire ceiling 
because of the costs involved. (Id.). Therefore, the 
plaintiffs took the risks of the premises as they were. 
They had knowledge superior to appellant's knowledge and 
took no further steps to protect themselves. 
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POINT II 
A LANDLORD IS NOT THE INSURER OF 
THE SAFETY OF HIS TENANT AND OWES 
NO DUTY TO PROTECT HIM FROM THE 
CRIMINAL ATTACKS OF THIRD PARTIES. 
This court has decided no cases bearing directly 
on this point. Other jurisdictions have considered 
similar issues. In King v. Ilikai Properties, 632 P.2d 
657 (Hawaii, 1981), the Hawaii Supreme Court affirmed 
summary judgment for a landlord when sued by a tenant who 
had been assaulted in the landlords1 condominium* The 
court held absent a special relationship between them, 
the landlord had no duty to protect the plaintiff-tenant 
from criminal attacks by third parties. In Davis v. 
Allied Supermarkets, Inc., 547 P.2d 963 (Okla. 1976), the 
Oklahoma court affirmed summary judgment for the 
supermarket when sued by a customer who was assaulted in 
the parking lot. The court held no duty was imposed upon 
the store to protect against the criminal acts of third 
parties* The court held the store was not an insurer of 
the safety of its customers. The closest Utah case is 
Gustaveson v. Gregg, 655 P.2d 693 (Utah 1982), where this 
court affirmed the trial courtfs reversal of a jury 
verdict in favor of a patron of a bowling alley. The 
patron was assaulted by a member of another bowling team. 
The proprietor was aware of the fact the plaintiff had 
reported tension and animosity between his team and the 
assailants' team. This court held: 
The proprietor of a public 
amusement has no duty to anticipate 
violence when neither the person 
exhibiting the violence nor others 
connected with him have previously 
engaged in any potentially violent 
activities. A proprietor has a 
duty to use ordinary care and 
diligence to protect patrons, but 
this duty does not extend to 
becoming an insurer of their 
safety. 
Id. at 695. 
In the instant case, the plaintiffs seek to hold 
appellant Brown as an insurer of their safety. The 
record is devoid of any evidence of the criminal nature 
of the first intruders in the apartment and their 
connection, if any, with the burglars. Mr. Brown assumed 
that transients may have been seeking shelter from the 
storm in the first instance. He checked and secured the 
room, personally and through his manager. In both 
instances there was no evidence of any attempt to 
penetrate into the jewelry store. (R.335, 350, 370-71, 
377-78, 388). In fact, Mr. Brown was a victim of the 
burglary in that the unknown parties broke a locked 
window to enter the apartment. They then broke through 
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the lath and plaster layer. (R.350f 371f 656; Exhibit 
1-1, 20). In the first intrusion, there was no evidence 
of any criminal activity. Appellant Brown used ordinary 
care and diligence. He locked the windows and locked the 
door. Moreover, the court committed reversable error 
when it refused appellant Brown's Instruction Number 22 
(R.186), advising the jury the landlord is not an insurer 
of the safety of the tenants, and Instruction Number 21 
(R.185), that the landlord is not obligated to protect 
the tenant from the criminal acts of third parties. 
The trial court failed to give the instructions 
requiring a special duty to be proven before liability 
may be imposed on the landlord. Without the particular 
instructions, sought by appellant Brown, the jury was 
left with the impression that a landlord was an insurer 
or guarantor of the safety of the tenant. Moreover, the 
plaintiffs produced no evidence of the landlord's duty of 
care. No such standard is articulated in the record or 
in the instructions. 
POINT III 
THE PROXIMATE CAUSE OF THE 
PLAINTIFFS1 INJURIES WAS THE 
INTERVENING CRIMINAL ACT OF THIRD 
PARTIES FOR WHICH THE APPELLANT 
CANNOT BE LIABLE. 
Other jurisdictions have considered similar 
issues to the case at bar. In McCappin v. Park Capital 
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Corporation 126 A.2d 51 (N. J, 1956) , the court faced a 
problem of a tenant who had lost money from her apartment 
when no forced entry had been made. The landlordfs 
superintendent had kept the keys to all the apartments on 
a peg board, which eventually was moved to an area of 
common access. Several keys were found missing, 
including the key to the plaintifffs apartment. At 
approximately the same time of that discovery, her 
apartment was entered without force and she suffered a 
loss. The trial court had found for the tenant and the 
appellate court reversed. It held that no proximate 
cause had been established between the missing keys and 
the loss of the money and granted judgment to the 
landlord. Similarly, in Panglorne v. Weiss, 90 A. 1024 
(N. J. 1914), a New Jersey court held the landlord was 
not liable to a tenant where the landlord had removed the 
lock to the tenantfs door in order to effect repairs when 
a burglary occurred. Additionally, in Andrews v. Kinsel, 
40 S.E. 300 (Georgia, 1901), the court refused relief to 
the tenants based on a negligence theory where the 
landlord had left the windows open in an adjoining 
tenantfs premises, after having removed for purposes of 
repair of partition between the plaintiff's premises and 
the other tenant's premises. The court held that the 
intervening theft, not the landlord's negligence was the 
proximate cause of the loss. In the instant case, 
testimony demonstrates that Mr. Brown acted reasonably. 
He had cut holes in the apartment floor in order to 
effect repairs. He was attempting to locate leaks and 
was eventually reconstructing the entire room including 
the plumbing. (R. 382, 645). There is no evidence that 
he acted unreasonably. 
The trial court refused to give appellant 
Brown's requested Instructions Numbers 20, 21, and 22, as 
cited supra. The court further compounded this error 
when it refused to give appellant Brown's Instruction 
Number 23 (R.187), that when two causes for an injury 
exist and are independent of each other, the later and 
intervening cause is generally the proximate cause of the 
loss. This instruction quotes verbatim the law in Utah 
in Cooke v. Mortensen, 624 P.2d 675 (Utah 1981). The 
court's refusal to give these instructions, especially in 
light of the fact the court gave Instruction Number 10 
(R.97) compounded the error. The jury in effect was left 
with the impression that it could find liability for the 
criminal conduct of third parties without measuring that 
conduct in the context of the landlord's duty toward his 
tenant. 
The record is devoid of any evidence the system 
was defeated because of the hole in the floor. In factf 
the hole did not penetrate into the plaintiffs1 premises; 
it was restricted entirely to the apartment upstairs. 
Mr. Brown was engaged in legitimate conduct in effecting 
reconstruction of the apartment. He took reasonable 
steps to secure the premises by locking the door and 
locking the windows. Notwithstanding these stepsf 
unknown criminal parties burglarized his apartment/ broke 
through the lath and plaster ceiling and entered the 
plaintiffs' premises. Theref they defeated the burglary 
system. This was a very sophisticated group of burglarsf 
so much so that even the security system personnel and 
investigating officer may not have been able to have 
performed the same operation. (R. 321, 580). 
POINT IV 
THE PLAINTIFFS FAILED TO LAY ADEQUATE FOUNDATION 
FOR THE ADMISSIONS OF THEIR ADMISSION OF THEIR 
EXHIBITS RELATING TO INVENTORY LOSSES. 
Rule 702f Utah Rules of Evidence, provides: 
If scientific/ technical/ or other 
special knowledge will assist the 
trier of fact to understand the 
evidence or determine a fact in 
issuef a witness qualified as an 
expert by knowledge/ skill/ 
experience, training or education/ 
may testify thereto and form an 
opinion or otherwise. 
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Audrey Steadmanf secretary of Steadman 
Enterprises, Inc., took the stand and began to testify 
about Exhibit 6, a list of losses sustained by the 
plaintiffs. (R.398, 487-88). She testified the 
plaintiffs assembled as a committee and began to list 
their apparent losses. Appellant objected to the 
admission of that exhibit as lacking the requisite 
foundation either as a document or her expertise in 
testifying to value. The trial court overruled the 
objections. She went on to testify to the value of her 
own diamond ring over objection foundation regarding the 
value. (R.410-11). She did not even know where the 
diamond was purchased (R.427), its value (R.428), or its 
cost. (R.428-30). In fact, Mr. Virgil Steadman, her 
husband, an officer of the corporation, testified she did 
not know about pricing. (R.468). 
Rodney Steadman eventually was called to the 
stand and through him Exhibit 10 (logbook) (R. 510) was 
entered into evidence over the appellant's objections to 
foundation regarding the values. (R.510, 512). The same 
objection was made for Exhibits 11, 12, 13, 14, 15, 16, 
17, 8, and 18. (R.510-24). These exhibits comprise the 
plaintiffs1 entire evidence of their losses. Nowhere in 
the direct examination of Virgil Steadman or Rodney 
Steadman was there any evidence of the foundation for 
compiling these exhibits or for the values contained 
within them. Neither was ever qualified to give any 
opinion regarding the values. No evidence is in the 
record regarding the expertise of any of the individuals 
who testified regarding these particular exhibits. The 
trial testimony mentioned lists which were never 
produced. None of the witnesses attempting to lay the 
foundation for these exhibits was ever qualified as a 
jeweler or an expert in the field of precious gems and 
metals and jewelry items. The court allowed a list to 
come in for value without any foundation regarding that 
value. There was no evidence of the "knowledge, skill, 
experience, trainingf or education," to testify to an 
opinion or otherwise regarding the values of any of these 
exhibits. 
Further, the foundation for these exhibits was 
lacking to allow them in as hearsay exceptions. They did 
not qualify as records of regularly conducted activities 
as allowed under Rule 803 (6) , Utah Rules of Evidence, 
since no foundation was layed they were kept in the 
course of regularly conducted activity. In fact, they 
could not so qualify because the lists were constructed 
after the loss. Further, if these exhibits were offered 
as summaries, the plaintiffs failed again to lay the 
necessary foundation. Rule 1006, Utah Rules of Evidence, 
provides that the underlying data for summaries must be 
produced in court. The underlying data was not produced 
in court in the instant case and the plaintiffs did not 
carry their burden of making the records available. Gull 
Labs, Inc. v. Lewis A. Roser Co., 589 P.2d 756 (Utah 
1978). The testimony regarding values did not qualify as 
owners giving opinion regarding the value of their own 
property. No such foundation is in the record. Moreover 
these exhibits were values of specialized 
items—jewelry—which require expert testimony and the 
proper foundation for an individual so testifying. The 
record is devoid of any such foundation. Therefore, the 
appellant was seriously prejudiced in that the only 
evidence of value given at trial did not meet any of the 
necessary foundational requirements. 
CONCLUSION 
There is no duty owed toward a tenant in a 
commercial monthly tenancy by the landlord. The tenant 
accepts the premises "as is,f. The landlord cannot be the 
guarantor or insurer of the safety of the tenant. The 
landlord cannot be required to protect the tenant from 
the world at large. The evidence is deficient in showing 
what the landlord's duty of care was under the 
circumstances. The record is totally devoid of any 
evidence that the appellant landlord acted or failed to 
act unreasonably. In fact, the evidence is just the 
opposite. He was engaged in a legitimate and socially 
useful operation of reconstructing an apartment. He 
locked and secured the doors and windows to that 
apartment. Unknown burglars broke into his apartment and 
then broke through a ceiling layer into the respondents1 
premises, a premises inadequately protected by a burglary 
alarm system of which only they knew its particular 
shortcomingsf with the exception of the burglars 
themselves. 
The trial court committed reversible error when 
it failed to grant the appellantfs motion for a directed 
verdict at the close of the respondents1 case. It 
allowed the case to go to the jury without articulating 
for them the standard of care under a commercial tenancy. 
It failed to instruct the jury about the special 
circumstances of such a tenancy. Moreover/ the trial 
court allowed the matter to go to the jury without any 
instructions regarding the duty owed by a landlord to a 
tenant. The court refused the appellantfs instructions 
submitted on that duty and gave them no guidelines to 
judge the appellantfs conduct. The court left the jury 
with the impression that the landlord, in effect, 
guaranteed the safety of the tenant from attacks of 
criminal third parties. Further, when the court refused 
the appellantfs instruction on proximate cause and 
intervening cause, it gave the jury no guideline for 
evaluating liability for the criminal acts of third 
parties. 
Therefore, appellant asks this Court to reverse 
the judgment and order the trial court to enter judgment 
in its favor. 
DATED this (D day of December, 1985. 
HANSON, DUNN, EPPERSON & SMITH 
'Mil 
T. fSl TSAKALOS 
Attorney for Appellant 
ADDENDUM 
Instruction No. 10f given by the Court (R. 97) 
Instruction No. 20, requested by appellant (R. 184) 
Instruction No. 21, requested by appellant (R. 185) 
Instruction No. 22, requested by appellant (R. 186) 
Instruction No. 23, requested by appellant (R. 187) 
_ o o _ 
CERTIFICATE OF SERVICE 
I hereby certify that I hand delivered four true 
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INSTRUCTION NO. 
The proximate cause of an injury is that cause which, in 
natural and continuous sequencer produces the injury, and without 
which the result would not have occurred. It is the efficient 
cause—the one that necessarily sets in operation the factors 
that accomplish the injury. 
Proximate cause is that cause which in natural and 
continuous sequence produces the injury without which the result 
would not have occurred. The fact that the instrumentality which 
produced the injury was criminal conduct of a third person would 
not preclude a finding of proximate cause if the intervening 
agency was itself a foreseeable act. 
INSTRUCTION NO. 
Plaintiffs rented the premises under a monthly tenancy 
and not under a written lease. 
Under Utah law, a tenant of a commercial building 
accepts the risks of the premises "as is" and the landlord owes 
no duty of protection toward him* 
It is, therefore, the duty of the tenant to examine the 
premises and determine their suitability. 
Jesperson v. Deseret News Publishing Company, (Ut. 1951) 225 
P.2d 1050; Wolfe v. Wite, (Ut. 1948) 197 P.2d 125. 
INSTRUCTION NO. Zl 
A landlord has no duty to protect a tenant from the 
criminal attacks of third parties. 
King v. Ilikai Propertiesy (Haw. 1981) 632 P.2d 657. 
INSTRUCTION NO . Zl 
A landlord is not an insurer of the safety of his 
tenants. He has no duty to anticipate the criminal conduct of 
third parties. 
Robicheaux v. Roy, (La. 1977) 352 S.2d 766; McCappin v. Park 
Capitol Corporation, (N.J. 1956) 126 Atl.2d) 51; Panglorne v. 
Weiss, (N.J. 1914) 90 Atl. 1024; Andrews v. Kinsel, (Ga. 1901) 40 
S.E. 300; Teallv v. Harlow, (Mass. 1951) 176 N.E. 533. 
INSTRUCTION NO. Z3 
When there exists two possible causes for an injury, and 
these causes are independent of each other, the later and 
intervening cause is generally to be viewed as the proximate 
cause of the accident. 
Cooke v. Mortensen, (Ut. 1981) 624 P.2d 675. 
